In the 1990s polls showed that the majority of Russians hoped to live in a post-Soviet country governed not only by a strong state but by the genuine rule of law. What happened to make Russian public opinion turn—or seem to turn—in the course of a few short years toward what might be called an ultranationalist, and sometimes lawless, “make Russia great again” attitude? And why did the Russian leadership decide to start exporting those views and values to democratic countries? To answer these questions Professor Clowes’s article focuses on the rhetoric and actions of two prominent ultra-nationalist demagogues—Aleksandr Prokhanov and Aleksandr Dugin, whose blueprints anticipated and then promoted aspects of contemporary Russian geopolitics. Drawing from concepts of the “cultural archive” and “usable history,” she considers why ultraconservatism became dominant in Russia today. Finally, she comments on resonances, and in some cases interactions, with various ultraconservative groups in Europe and the United States.